




The Paris Police Court requested the Court of Justice of the European
Communities' for a preliminary ruling 2 to determine the compatibility of
France's mandatory airfare approval procedure 3 with the Community's
competitive policies. 4 Defendants, New Frontier Airlines, 5 Air France,
6
and KLM7 had been charged with violating France's concerted airfare
policy.8 After frustrating attempts by the defendants to deny its jurisdic-
*The author is a third-year law student at the University of Virginia. He was the 1986
recipient of the International Law and Practice Section's Baxter Fellowship for study at
The Hague Academy of International Law.
1. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 164-68, 298 U.N.T.S. II (entered into force Jan.
1, 1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. This is requested by a national court for an authoritative interpretation of Community
law. Its analogue in U.S. civil procedure is an interlocutory appeal. The preliminary ruling
interrupts the proceedings in the national court. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 177; see
also L. Brown & F. Jacobs, the Court of Justice of the European Communities 152-73 (2d
ed. 1983).
3. See French Civil Aviation Code, C. Civ. Av., arts L 330-3, R 330-9, R 330-15. Article
L 330-3 requires that airlines submit their fares as a requisite for approval by the Civil
Aviation Minister. Article 330-9(2) extends this requirement to foreign companies. Article
R 330-15 establishes a criminal penalty against operators who fail to comply with these
provisions. For full texts of these statutes, see Annex to the Opinion of Adv. Gen. Lenz
(Sept. 24, 1985), [1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,801
(1986) [hereinafter Lenz Opinion].
4. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85. Among the prohibited practices enumerated in art.
85, para. 1, are those having the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition
within the Common Market, by "(a) direct[ly] or indirect[ly] fixing of purchase or selling
prices or any other trading conditions; ... (c) shar[ing] markets or sources of supply." Id.
5. Docketed in case 211/84 (Aug. 17, 1984).
6. Docketed in case 212/84 (Aug. 17, 1984).
7. See case 209/84 (docketed Aug. 17, 1984). All these cases were combined as per E.
Comm. Ct. J. R. 43.
8. As a practical matter, only New Frontier Airlines and KLM were offering fares below
that established by the Ministry. Air France joined the action only to participate in arguing
for the continuation of the restrictive policy. The governments of France, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, and the United Kingdom also participated in the written procedure before the
European Court.
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tion in the case, 9 the Court of Justice, sitting in plenary session, 10 held
that a Member State's enforcement of mandatory air fares violates EEC
Treaty articles 5, 3(f), and 85(1), in the absence of Council regulations
adopted under article 87, only when the concerted practice has been
recorded by the Commission under article 88 or by a national authority
under article 89(2). Establishment of Air Fares: Applicability of the Rules
on Competition in the EEC Treaty, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. ,
[1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287 (1986) (Pre-
liminary Ruling).
The common transport policy originally contemplated for the Com-
munity in the Treaty of Rome I was primarily intended for road, rail, and
inland waterway networks. 12 Formation of an integrated policy for sea
and air transport that would allow for free movement of goods and per-
sons, consumer choice, and equality of treatment in the Community 13
was considered a distant goal in 1957. Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty
places the airline and shipping industries outside the framework of a
common transport policy until such time as the Council of the Community 14
by unanimous vote, decides "whether, to what extent, and by what pro-
cedure appropriate provisions may be adopted." 15 Although this provision
did not explicitly give the Commission 16 the right to make proposals to
the Council on this subject, 17 the Commission has, in fact, done so. 18 To
9. The Court first denied the arguments of Air France, KLM, and the French Republic,
that the trial judge was not competent to request a preliminary ruling. See Judgment of the
Court, Apr. 30, 1986, Cases 209-13/84, Establishment of Air Fares: Applicability of the Rules
on Competition in the EEC Treaty (Preliminary Ruling) $ 9-10 [hereinafter Air Fares Case];
see also, ONPTS v. Damiani, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 273. Likewise, the Court rejected
the idea that the trial court's reference did not sufficiently specify the precise provisions of
French and Community law to be used in the decision. See Air Fares Case, $$ 11-16.
10. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 165, para. 1.
11. Id. arts. 74-84.
12. Id. art. 84, para. I.
13. Id. art. 75; see also I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1812 (1985).
14. The authority for which is described in the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 145.
15. Id. art. 84, para. 2.
16. For a description of the rights and duties of the Commission, see id. arts. 155-63.
17. See generally Close, Article 84 EEC: The Development of Transport Policy in the
Sea and Air Sectors, 5 EUR. L. REV. 188 (1980).
18. See EEC Comm., Eighth General Report No. 239 (1965); EUR. PARL. RES., 5 J.O.
COMM. EuR. 70 (1961); 8 J.O. COMM. EUR. 1702 (1965); E.E.C. Comm. Seventh General
Report No. 410 (1973); Memorandum, Air Transport: A Community Approach, 1979 E.C.
Bull. Supp. No. 5 (proposing easier access to markets, more transparent and rational tariffs,
and applying Treaty competition rules to this sector); 1981 E.C. Bull. No. 7/8, $ 1.3.1 (1979)
(suggestions formally submitted to Council). For the Commission's most recent proposals,
particularly focusing on capacity, pooling, and fare agreements, see 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10726, 10762-63 (1985-1986); Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Progress Towards
the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy, COM (84) 72 final; Commission
White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, June 14, 1983, COM (85) 310 final. See also,
Thaine, The Way Ahead from Memo 2: The Need for More Competition and a Better Deal
for Europe, 10 Air Law 90 (1985) (describing the EC's 1984 initiatives in this area).
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date, the Council has taken only cursory action. 19 Aside from directives
on consultation procedures, noise emissions, and accident investiga-
tions,20 no binding regulations have been issued under the authority of
article 84(2).
European commercial air services are characterized by high fares, poor
scheduling, and restrictive practices. One member of the European Com-
mission has recently noted that "air transport is currently imprisoned in
a straitjacket of excessive national regulation governing bilateral airline
fare agreements .... ,21 In practice, air fares are established by the na-
tional air carriers 22 and are then enforced by the governments. When an
airline has attempted to cut fares or improve service on a route, the other
foreign government has often intervened to force the competitive airline
to align its policies with its own airline. The result is that the less efficient
airline on a given route can dictate the level of fares and services and in
effect can bring its more efficient rivals down to its own level. 23 This
system has been legitimized internationally by a number of instruments. 24
Despairing of the Council's lack of progress in deregulating the airline
industry, the Commission, and certain Member States, most notably the
United Kingdom, have pressed for other legal measures. The Commission
19. The Council's and Commission's relative inactivity in this area of regulation has
already drawn one suit before the European Court. Lord Bethell, a British member of the
European Parliament, sought to force the Commission to propose measures to end airline
price-fixing. The Court dismissed this case on procedural grounds, holding that Lord Bethell
lacked standing. Lord Bethell v. Comm., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2277, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8858 (1982). See infra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
20. See 2 LAW OF THE EEC 836 (Supp. 1984).
21. See Peter Sutherland's Remarks, Jan. 30, 1986, reprinted in 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10762 (1986).
22. Agreement is often reached with the collaboration of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA). See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 21, 22.
23. Id.
24. There are four distinct regulatory overlays for commercial air transport: (1) The
Chicago Convention, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 6605, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, which
provides that "no scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the
territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization
of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization"; (2) This
provision necessitated the conclusion of bilateral air services agreements, the current pro-
totype for which is the Air Services Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United
Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter Bermuda II], which deals with
the establishment of fares at art. 11; (3) Regional and industry associations also set fares.
These would include, for Europe, the International Air Transport Association, and the
regime created by the International Agreement on the Procedure for the Establishment of
Tariffs for Scheduled Air Services, July 10, 1967, 696 U.N.T.S. 31, the governing authority
for which is the European Civil Aviation Conference. For its position on European air
deregulation, see 11 AIR LAW 48 (1985) (ECAC Communique). (4) Finally, there is the system
of competition regulation, governed by the EEC, which is the subject of this casenote. See
discussion in Lenz Opinion, supra note 3, at 16,782.
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has also rejected substantive proposals that would exempt IATA-sponsored
route-pooling and fare agreements from the scope of EEC article 85's
prohibition of concerted practices. 25 While the Commission would be
willing to grant a certain degree of antitrust immunity to these concerted
agreements for a transitional period, 26 it has warned that airlines can
expect a direct challenge to their current practices. 27 Even though legal
recourse is not as desirable as a Council directive, 28 the Commission has
proceeded with actions to win free and fair competition in this vital sector
of the European economy.
The Air Fares Case, although arising without the direct intervention of
the Commission or those nations seeking airline deregulation, is the first
salvo in this campaign. In one sense, however, an earlier decision of the
Court had overcome a key stumbling block now facing those arguing that
air transport is subject to article 85's antitrust provisions. In Commission
v. French Republic29 the Court acknowledged that article 84(2)'s exclusion
of sea and air transport from the realm of a common transportation policy
did not invalidate the application of other treaty provisions, including
those on freedom of movement and work. 30 Denying the principle of this
case, the French Government contended that article 84(2) only subjects
sea and air transport to Part Two of the Treaty (Foundations of the
Community) and not to the policy provisions of Part Three. 31 The court
replied that the "Treaty's rules on competition ... apply to the transport
sector independently of the institution of a common transport policy." 32
Moreover, when the drafters of the Treaty of Rome wished to exclude
certain activities from the antitrust rules, they made a specific exception. 33
Consequently, the Court ruled that air transport is subject to article 85's
prohibition of concerted activities. 34
Being subject to Community competition rules was not sufficient, how-
ever, to find France's enforcement of air fare agreements a violation of
25. See 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2760 (1983). Were regulations to be adopted, they
would essentially follow those already set for other sectors of the economy. See Regs. No.
17 & No. 1017/68, reprinted in 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 (1985).
26. One accepted principle is that the regulations would allow a Member State to intervene
in enforcing capacity agreements when the market share of its national airline falls below
25 percent. See 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10726 (1985).
27. 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10762 (1986).
28. 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10726 (1985) (remarks by Commissioner Clinton Davis).
29. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8270 (1974).
30. At stake in this case was France's Employment at Sea Code, which required a certain
number of French nationals manning French vessels. The court ruled this practice incon-
sistent with Community policy. Id.
31. See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 34.
32. Id. 39.
33. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 42 (exemption of common agricultural policy).
34. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 42.
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article 85. Without a Council directive issued under article 87,35 jurisdic-
tion over matters of competitive policy is shared by the Commission 36
and by the "national authorities" of Member States. 37 The French and
Italian Governments accordingly argued that since the air transport sector
was under the jurisdiction of national authorities, and that such agencies
could grant exemptions from articles 85(1)'s antitrust prohibition, 38 the
practice of fare agreements could not violate Community law.
In adopting this view, the Court first had to deny that a "national
authority," namely the Paris Police Court, had ruled on the admissibility
of these agreements. The concept of "authorities in Member States"
means either "the administrative authorities responsible in most Member
States for enforcing national laws on competition . . ., or the courts to
which the same responsibility has been assigned. . . ,,39 This definition
did not include criminal courts charged with punishing violations of the
law. 40
35. This provision notes that if regulations implementing the antitrust prohibition of article
85 are not adopted within three years of the EEC Treaty's entry into force, the Council
may act on a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the Assembly (now the European Parliament). See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 87,
para. 1. The adoption of these directives would be necessary to "establish a system ensuring
that competition is not distorted in the Common Market, and to provide for the balanced
application of Articles 85 and 86 uniformly within the Member States." See Council Reg-
ulation No. 17, 5 J.O. EUR. COMM. 204 (1962).
36. Article 89 of the EEC Treaty reads as follows:
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 88, the Commission shall, upon taking
up its duties, ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85 and
86. It shall, at the request of a Member State or ex officio, investigate, in conjunction
with the competent authorities of the Member States which shall lend it their as-
sistance, any alleged infringement of the above-mentioned principles. If it finds that
such infringement has taken place, it shall propose appropriate means for bringing
it to an end.
2. If such infringement continues, the Commission shall, by means of a reasoned
decision, confirm the existence of such infringement of the principles. The Com-
mission may publish its decision and may authorize Member States to take the
necessary measures, of which it shall determine the conditions and particulars, to
remedy the situation.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89. No such "reasoned decision" concerning air fare agree-
ments has been recorded. See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 59. The terms of Regulation
No. 17, supra note 35, which renders all concerted practices unlawful, "no prior decision
to that effect being required," does not apply to the air transport sector owing to the
exemption of art. 84(2).
37. Article 88 of the EEC treaty reads, in part, as follows:
"Until the date of the entry into force of the provisions adopted in application of Article
87, the authorities of Member States shall ... rule -upon the admissibility of any
understanding and upon any improper advantage taken of a dominant position in the
Common Market."
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88.
38. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, para. 3.
39. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, t 55; see also Preliminary Ruling, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 51.
40. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, $ 56. The Court seemed to be distinguishing admin-
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The Commission then advanced the suspect notion that even without
the implementing measures of article 87, national judges may find specific
practices incompatible with Community competition rules. 41 This argu-
ment would suggest that articles 88 and 89 are self-executing, a view
which, if accepted, would vastly expand the competence of the Commis-
sion into areas the Council has yet to regulate. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that this principle has been consistently rejected as disruptive of the
basic order of the Community. The Court here reasserted that "Articles
88 and 89 do not by nature guarantee full and complete application of
Article 85 and do not, merely by virtue of their existence, ensure that
Article 85 was fully effective upon the entry into force of the Treaty." 42
Therefore, to void automatically an agreement that falls under the scope
of article 85's prohibition, "would be contrary to the general principles
of legal security." 43 Since articles 88 and 89 are not directly applicable,
and the Commission has not yet issued a reasoned statement of opposition,
the Paris Police Court is not competent as a national authority to assert
the incompatibility of the air fare agreements with article 85(1).44 The
Paris Police Court can thus proceed with the prosecution.
The European Court of Justice could well have ended the decision with
that holding. Instead, it proceeded to a rather different, and theoretical,
question. The Court asked, in effect, whether government enforcement
of fare agreements would violate Community policy if there were an
enabling Commission recording or a finding by a national authority. The
Member States appearing before the Court had earnestly hoped that it
would not detour in this direction. 45 In response, the Court noted that
Member States violate article 85 when they take or maintain in force any
measures that would reinforce an anticompetitive practice. 46 Air France
and the French Government contended that concerted air fares "are not
istrative policy-making from executive enforcement. It seems that the terms of the French
C. Civ. Av., supra note 3, art. R 330-15, only delegated to the Police Court, a local criminal
tribunal, the authority to punish established violations, and not to determine the policy
itself.
41. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 49.
42. Id. 161; see also De Geus v. Bosch, 1962 Recueil 89, 91, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8003 (1962). The Commission further argued that Bosch's
holding, relating as it did to cartels concluded before the Treaty, should not be applied to
air transport agreements. The Court rejected this by simply noting that the rule in Bosch
is valid in all cases. See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 67.
43. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 1 63-64.
44. Id. $ 68.
45. See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, t 48 for remarks by the Netherlands, where the
Dutch Government also asserts the impossibility, within the context of a preliminary ruling
such as this, of determining the existence of infringements.
46. See Air Fares Case, supra note 9, $ 71; see also Preliminary Ruling, 1977 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2115.
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the result of a mandatory fare approval mechanism such as exists in
France," but, rather, are the product of independent industry decisions. 47
Here the Court adopted the suggestion of the United Kingdom and the
Commission that "while national fare-approval rules are not in themselves
a measure requiring [airlines] to release themselves from the obligations
of Article 85, such would not be the case if the national authorities required
the airlines to submit only fares agreed to among themselves .. .and
refused approval to fares submitted independently." 48 This opinion means
that these practices will be found anticompetitive when there is a Com-
mission recording (taking effect on a Community-wide basis) or a ruling
of a national authority.
While the decision in the Air Fares Case only will have oblique legal
effect, it should have profound consequences in promoting deregulation
of air travel in Europe. For the Paris tribunal the European Court's inter-
pretation of Community law is binding in this case. Like those that ques-
tioned the Oracle of Delphi, a judge referring an issue must submit to the
ruling of the Court. 49 As already noted, the European Court's decision
simply permits the Paris Police Court to consider the prosecution. No
revision or interpretation may be given for the ruling, although the Paris
Court could conceivably apply for a new decision. 50 Except in the United
Kingdom, where preliminary rulings of the European Court are given
binding force by statute, 51 the decision in the Air Fares Case is neither
enforceable 52 nor acts as res judicata. 53 The ruling, moreover, leaves the
Court functus officio, without further jurisdiction in the matter.54
Nevertheless, a preliminary ruling is declaratory of Community law and
may be relied on in later proceedings. 55 As a result, "in a case raising a
question on which the Court has already ruled, the national court has a
47. Air Fares Case, supra note 9, 73.
48. Id. 74.
49. See Milch-, Fett-, und Eierkontor v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken, 1969 Recueil 165,
166, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. $ 8096 (1967) ("An interpretation given
by the Court of Justice binds the national court in question but it is for the latter to decide
whether it is sufficiently enlightened by the preliminary ruling given or whether it is necessary
to make a further reference to the Court").
50. See Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, 1971 Recueil 69, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) V 8101 (1971).
51. See European Communities Act, ch. 42 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Benedetti v. Munari, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 163, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8406 (1977).
53. See Manzoni v. FNROM, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1647, 1662 (Warner, Adv. G.).
54. See K. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 291
(1984).
55. See Da Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, 1963 Recueil
31, 38, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8010 (1983); Amministra-
zione v. Denkavit, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1205, 1232, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8665 (1980).
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choice: it can either apply the ruling or seek a new ruling. But it is bound
by the ruling in the sense that it cannot simply disregard it."' 56 The Court's
decision declaring air fare agreements anticompetitive will thus be en-
forced in those Member States whose competent "national authorities"
likewise declare the practice violative of Treaty article 85.
Unilateral national action of this sort, even by the United Kingdom,
is, however, unlikely. For one Member State to declare capacity and fare
agreements uncompetitive would likely result in that country's national
air carrier being denied landing rights in other Community states. 57 Such
a unilateral declaration, premised on the application of Community law
as interpreted in the Air Fares Case, could only affect air routes with
other EEC members. Bilateral air transport agreements with third states
(particularly those with the United States for trans-Atlantic routes) would
continue to be governed by standing Air Services Agreements. 5 8
The European Court's decision has already emboldened the Commis-
sion to threaten the issuance of a reasoned decision declaring, under
article 89(2), that air fare agreements are an infringement of article 85. 59
Member States would be barred from enforcing concerted practices in
the air industry. This policy might compel the Council to adopt the di-
rectives needed under article 87 to bring this area entirely within the orbit
of Community regulation. 60 A further possibility is that the Council's hand
might be forced were a Member State to go before the Court and claim
that the Council had failed to act on this matter.6 1
56. L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 283.
57. It would undoubtedly be argued by a Member State seeking deregulation that a
termination of landing rights in countries wishing to perpetuate the regime would violate
other portions of the EEC Treaty, most notably arts. 9-11 (establishing a customs union),
and art. 61 (elimination of restrictions on services).
58. See, e.g., Bermuda II, supra note 24. It is unlikely that the Commission would suggest
that fare agreements for "continuing services" from overseas (for example, the New York-
London-Paris route) would impact intra-Community transport and so also should be dereg-
ulated. The Commission may just be concerned to enforce exclusively intra-Community air
deregulation. Moreover, trans-Atlantic traffic has been substantially deregulated by the
operation of U.S. antitrust law. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 916-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (for background on Laker's antitrust action).
59. See Commission Release, June 20, 1986, COM (86) 338 final, reprinted in 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,798 and 10,804 (1986).
60. In Commission White Paper, supra note 18, 1I11, the Commission declared that "If
the Council fails to make progress towards the adoption of proposed Regulations concerning
the application of the competition rules to air transport, the Commission intends to take
decisions regarding existing infringements ... according to Article 89 of the Treaty." If the
Council does not act, the Commission will bring suit against offending airlines under art.
89(2). See Commission Release, supra note 59.
61. Suits against a Community institution for inaction are permitted under art. 175. This
was the sort of suit brought by Lord Bethell against the Commission, see supra note 19.
Were it brought by a Member State (probably the United Kingdom) it would not be dismissed
for lack of standing. Nevertheless, it must be shown that the Council has been called upon
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The result, at any rate, of the Court's decision will be to accelerate the
tempo of air deregulation in Europe. The final results of this process,
whether initiated by Member States, the Commission, or the Council,
will not likely mirror the United States' experience in this area.62 Euro-
pean reform in this vital sector will be slow and incremental. 63 Nonethe-
less, the European air passenger will welcome any measure of change.
to act in this matter, and that it has the authority to act. The grant of discretion under art.
84(2) might, however, preclude the contention that the Council is under any obligation to
act. Also, as the plenipotentiary organ of the Community, see art. 145, it is arguable whether
the Council is obliged to do anything. See also European Parliament v. Council, 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, [1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,191
(1986) (holding that the Council acted contrary to the Treaty of Rome by failing to ensure
freedom in providing services in the sphere of international transport and in not establishing
conditions under which nonresident carriers may operate in the Community; in all other
respects of a common transport policy, the Council acts at its own descretion).
62. See Remarks of Commissioner Davis, Sept. 11, 1985, reprinted in 4 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) $ 10726 (1985), where he stated:
We refuse to bring about this [an American] sort of market free-for-all. Conditions in the
United States are quite different from those in the Community; the U.S. has different
social, economic and fiscal laws; the U.S. government takes a relaxed view about the
fate of any one of its national carriers.
63. The most probable features of European air deregulation will be: (1) application to
the Community alone; (2) prohibition of predatory fares; (3) allowing government interven-
tion in capacity agreements when a national airline's market share drops below 25 percent
and in cases of a precipitous reduction below 45 percent; (4) revenue-sharing and fare
consultation between airlines for another seven years; (5) extensive group exemptions under
article 85(3); and (6) Community-sponsored, binding, and unilateral arbitration procedures.
This system will have a trial period of four years, with Commission review after three. See
Commission Release, January 1986, reprinted in 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10763 (1986);
Commission Release, supra note 59, 4, 11, 13, 14, 29, 31, and annex II.
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